A Loan and a Prayer
The countries known collectively as the PIIGS – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain – are burdened with increasingly unsustainable levels of public and private debt. Several of the worst-hit – Portugal, Ireland, and Greece – have seen their borrowing costs soar to record highs in recent weeks, even after their loss of market access led to bailouts financed by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. Spanish borrowing costs are also rising.
Greece is clearly insolvent. Even with a draconian austerity package, totaling 10% of GDP, its public debt would rise to 160% of GDP. Portugal – where growth has been stagnant for a decade – is experiencing a slow-motion fiscal train wreck that will lead to public-sector insolvency. In Ireland and Spain, transferring the banking system’s huge losses to the government’s balance sheet – on top of already-escalating public debt – will eventually lead to sovereign insolvency.
The official approach, Plan A, has been to pretend that these economies suffer a liquidity crunch, not a solvency problem, and that the provision of bailout loans – together with fiscal austerity and structural reforms – can restore debt sustainability and market access. This “extend and pretend” or “lend and pray” approach is bound to fail, because, unfortunately, most of the options that indebted countries have used in the past to extricate themselves from excessive debt are not feasible.
For example, the time-honored solution of printing money and escaping debt via inflation is unavailable to the PIIGS, because they are trapped in the eurozone straitjacket. The only institution that can crank up the printing press – the European Central Bank – will never resort to monetization of fiscal deficits.
Nor can we expect rapid GDP growth to save these countries. The PIIGS’ debt burden is so high that robust economic performance is next to impossible. Moreover, whatever economic growth some of these countries might eventually register is contingent on enacting politically unpopular reforms that will work only in the long run – and at the cost of even more short-term pain.
To restore growth, these countries must also regain competitiveness by achieving a real depreciation of their currency, thus turning trade deficits into surpluses. But a rising euro – pushed higher by excessively early monetary tightening by the ECB – implies more real appreciation, further undermining competitiveness.
The German solution to this conundrum – keeping wage growth below that of productivity, thereby reducing unit labor costs – took more than a decade to yield results. If the PIIGS started that process today, the benefits would be too long in coming to restore competitiveness and growth.
The last option – deflation of wages and prices – to reduce costs, achieve a real depreciation, and restore competitiveness is associated with ever-deepening recession. The real depreciation necessary to restore external balance would drive the real value of euro debts even higher, making them even more unsustainable.
Lowering private and public consumption in order to boost private savings, and implementing fiscal austerity to reduce private and public debts, aren’t options, either. The private sector can spend less and save more, but this would entail an immediate cost known as Keynes’ paradox of thrift: declining economic output and rising debt as a share of GDP. Recent studies by the IMF and others suggest that raising taxes, cutting subsidies, and reducing government spending – even inefficient spending – would stifle growth in the short term, exacerbating the underlying debt problem.
If the PIIGS can’t inflate, grow, devalue, or save their way out of their problems, Plan A is either failing or is bound to fail. The only alternative is to shift quickly to Plan B – an orderly restructuring and reduction of the debts of these countries’ governments, households, and banks.
This can happen in a number of ways. One can carry out an orderly rescheduling of the PIIGS’ public debts without actually reducing the principal amount owed. This means extending the maturity dates of debts and reducing the interest rate on the new debt to levels much lower than currently unsustainable market rates. This solution limits the risk of contagion and the potential losses that financial institutions would bear if the value of debt principal were reduced.
Policymakers should also consider innovations used to help debt-burdened developing countries in the 1980’s and 1990’s. For example, bondholders could be encouraged to exchange existing bonds for GDP-linked bonds, which offer payouts pegged to future economic growth. In effect, these instruments turn creditors into shareholders in a country’s economy, entitling them to a portion of its future profits while temporarily reducing its debt burden.
Reducing the face value of mortgages and providing the upside – in case home prices were to rise in the long run – to the creditor banks is another way to convert mortgage debt partly into shareholder equity. Bank bonds could also be reduced and converted into equity, which would both avert a government takeover of banks and prevent socialization of bank losses from causing a sovereign debt crisis.
Europe cannot afford to continue throwing money at the problem and praying that growth and time will bring salvation. No one will descend from the heavens, deus ex machina, to bail out the IMF or the EU. The creditors and bondholders who lent the money in the first place must carry their share of the burden, for the sake of the PIIGS, the EU, and their own bottom lines.
Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm are co-authors of Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance, recently published in paperback in the US and UK.
All rights reserved, Roubini GlobalEconomics, LLC. Opinions expressed on RGE EconoMonitors are those of individual analysts and may or may not express RGE’s own consensus view. RGE is not a certified investment advisory service and aims to create an intellectual framework for informed financial decisions by its clients. This content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute, and may not be relied on as, investment advice or a recommendation of any investment or trading strategy. This information is intended for sophisticated professional investors who will exercise their own judgment and will independently evaluate factors bearing on the suitability of any investment or trading strategy. Information and views, including any changes or updates, may be made available first to certain RGE clients and others at RGE’s discretion. Roubini Global Economics, LLC is not an investment adviser.
6 Responses to “A Loan and a Prayer”
I have a question. Through this period of “muddling through” the crisis, has there been a migration from private creditors and bondholders to public agencies. Of course I am aware that a number of public agencies are taking a more aggressive position, but has this been accompanied with a transfer of the risk from the private creditors to public agencies – a slow migration of the risk form the private lenders, to the host government to the international financial governance system? If this is a fair description of the “muddle through” process, is it possible that once the end is reached, i.e. the internationalization of the risk, the crisis will mature and the political-financial conditions will be set for the orderly restructure of the debts?
I fully agree with your basic comments, that the problem is not "financial"(liquidity) but of long standing "economic"(solvency) mis management, which neither the UE nor the ECB nor the IMF appreciated when currently proposed measures could have, maybe(?), worked.
The problem is much wider in essence:the United States of the Euro has never existed, one treaty/summit after anothercreated the mis belief of stating that a partial commercial union was an economic (not to say political ! ) union. This being totally imposible in terms of the absence of fiscal/taxation and welfare/ social protection harmonizarton in the area..
Your different proposals of call it debt restructuring,which is the only realistic solution,are more undestandable by trained economists like you. As an international experienced businessman (worked in 3 continents and 7 countries "in situ"), I can only appreciate that unwise (not to call them speculators) lenders took undue risks and are against the wall in a big way, with supranational organizations trying to diminish potential loss impact by trying to impose irrational "corrective" measures -short term. They talk about contagion risks in the Euro area, the contagion will spread even quicker (see Spain, Belgium, Italy) and the penalties/costs will be even higher(see purchase of Greek obligations by ECB), if they "don't bite the bullet". I have started a blog a little more than a month ago on these subjects as a non trained economist ,called "macrovolatility.com", to comment as a layman , but as objectively as possible on various subjects of economic interest,l ike this one. I have taken up already too much space with above comments, which if they somewhat interest you and your team can be found in more detail in my blog.
Greetings from Florida! I’m bored at work so I decided to browse your blog on my iphone during lunch break. I love the information you present here and can’t wait to take a look when I get home. I’m surprised at how quick your blog loaded on my phone .. I’m not even using WIFI, just 3G .. Anyhow, good blog!
Great – I should definitely say I’m impressed with your web site. I had no trouble navigating through all tabs and related info. It ended up being truly easy to access. Excellent job…
I think any solution will be the wrong solution and will have negative affects because it does not resolve the underlying problems of capitalism.
Comfortably, the news post is during truthfulness a hottest on this subject well known subject matter