Fed Watch: QEInfinity Not

The Federal Reserve released the minutes of the June FOMC meeting today, but the contents had little in the way of groundbreaking news.  Most interesting was that Fed officials tired of being pestered about the “October or December” question regarding the end of the QE and decided to more or less commit to the earlier date:

Some committee members had been asked by members of the public whether, if tapering in the pace of purchases continues as expected, the final reduction would come in a single $15 billion per month reduction or in a  $10 billion reduction followed by a $5 billion reduction. Most participants viewed this as a technical issue with no substantive macroeconomic consequences and no consequences for the eventual decision about the timing of the first increase in the federal funds rate–a decision that will depend on the Committee’s evolving assessments of actual and expected progress toward its objectives.

In other words, who cares about that last $5 billion?  The Fed’s answer was to take away the mystery:

In light of these considerations, participants generally agreed that if incoming information continued to support its expectation of improvement in labor market conditions and a return of inflation toward its longer-run objective, it would be appropriate to complete asset purchases with a $15 billion reduction in the pace of purchases in order to avoid having the small, remaining level of purchases receive undue focus among investors.

with, of course, the usual “data dependent” caveat.  Thus the predictions of QE Infinity come to an end.  In other news, the Fed fretted over market complacency:

However, participants also discussed whether some recent trends in financial markets might suggest that investors were not appropriately taking account of risks in their investment decisions. In particular, low implied volatility in equity, currency, and fixed-income markets as well as signs of increased risk-taking were viewed by some participants as an indication that market participants were not factoring in sufficient uncertainty about the path of the economy and monetary policy.

I find this somewhat irritating. What is “sufficient” uncertainty? I find it especially irritating given that, as Josh Zumbrun at the Wall Street Journal reports, Fed officials themselves appear to have less uncertainty regarding the outlook:


If the Fed has a well-communicated reaction function, and there is little uncertainty about the outlook, why should there be uncertainty about the path of monetary policy?  The Fed’s unease about complacency seems misplaced.  The goal of the communications strategy should be to limit uncertainty regarding the path of monetary policy by clearing defining the objective function.  The only residual uncertainty will be economic uncertainty.  And even that arguably is reduced by establishing a well-communicated reaction function.

In any event, the Fed concluded that even if complacency is a problem, there is not much they can do about it:

They agreed that the Committee should continue to carefully monitor financial conditions and to emphasize in its communications the dependence of its policy decisions on the evolution of the economic outlook; it was also pointed out that, where appropriate, supervisory measures should be applied to address excessive risk-taking and associated financial imbalances. At the same time, it was noted that monetary policy needed to continue to promote the favorable financial conditions required to support the economic expansion.

Very similar to Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen’s recent comments:

Taking all of these factors into consideration, I do not presently see a need for monetary policy to deviate from a primary focus on attaining price stability and maximum employment, in order to address financial stability concerns. That said, I do see pockets of increased risk-taking across the financial system, and an acceleration or broadening of these concerns could necessitate a more robust macroprudential approach.

If the Fed wants to increase uncertainty and, presumably, reduce potential financial instability, they could do so by changing the reaction function in a hawkish direction.  The Fed, however, is not yet sufficiently concerned about complacency to attempt to gain more financial stability at the cost of economic growth.

Inflation remains well below target:


But the Fed believes we have seen the lows:

Readings on a range of price measures–including the PCE price index, the CPI, and a number of the analytical measures developed at the Reserve Banks–appeared to provide evidence that inflation had moved up recently from low levels earlier in the year, consistent with the Committee’s forecast of a gradual increase in inflation over the medium term. Reports from business contacts were mixed, spanning an absence of price pressures in some Districts and rising input costs in others. Some participants expressed concern about the persistence of below-trend inflation, and a couple of them suggested that the Committee may need to allow the unemployment rate to move below its longer-run normal level for a time in order keep inflation expectations anchored and return inflation to its 2 percent target, though one participant emphasized the risks of doing so. In contrast, some others expected a faster pickup in inflation or saw upside risks to inflation and inflation expectations because they anticipated a more rapid decline in economic slack.

Seems like broad agreement that inflation rates bottomed out, but less agreement on where they head from here.  Toward target, to be sure, but at what speed?  That question, like all the forecasts, feeds into future policy decisions:

Some participants suggested that the Committee’s communications about its forward guidance should emphasize more strongly that its policy decisions would depend on its ongoing assessment across a range of indicators of economic activity, labor market conditions, inflation and inflation expectations, and financial market developments. In that regard, circumstances that might entail either a slower or a more rapid removal of policy accommodation were cited. For example, a number of participants noted their concern that a more gradual approach might be appropriate if forecasts of above-trend economic growth later this year were not realized. And a couple suggested that the Committee might need to strengthen its commitment to maintain sufficient policy accommodation to return inflation to its target over the medium term in order to prevent an undesirable decline in inflation expectations. Alternatively, some other participants expressed concern that economic growth over the medium run might be faster than currently expected or that the rate of growth of potential output might be lower than currently expected, calling for a more rapid move to begin raising the federal funds rate in order to avoid significantly overshooting the Committee’s unemployment and inflation objectives.

Is there any new information here?  I think not.  The current expected path of rates is data dependent, and as that data changes, so too will the expected rate path. The pattern of rate forecasts in the Summary of Economic Projections largely reflects differing forecasts rather than differing reaction functions.  As the data evolves, the pattern of rate forecasts will converge as one of the paths becomes more obvious.

My own view is:

  1. The existing mix of data and forecasts suggest the first rate hike in the second quarter of 2015 with a gradual increase in rates thereafter.  This is my baseline.
  2. If unemployment continues to drop at the same rate as recent months, bring forward the rate hike to the first quarter but continue to assume a gradual increase.
  3. If core-PCE inflation exceeds 2.25% and wage growth is accelerating , expect first quarter liftoff and a steeper path of rate hikes.

Obviously, the data could suggest a delay in the first rate hike, but I do not believe the risks are weighted in that direction.  I think the risks are weighted toward tighter than expected policy.

Bottom Line:  Fairly straightforward minutes.  Policy is data dependent.  The Fed, like all of us, are simply waiting to see how that data evolves.

This piece is cross-posted from Tim Duy’s Fed Watch with permission.