China’s reserves are still growing, but at a slower pace than before

If China’s euros, pounds, yen and other non-dollar reserves were managed as a separate portfolio, China’s non-dollar portfolio would be bigger than the total reserves of all countries other than Japan. It would also, in my view, be bigger than the portfolio of the world’s largest sovereign fund. That is just one sign of how large China’s reserves really are.

Roughly a third ($650 billion) of China’s $1954 billion in reported foreign exchange reserves aren’t invested in dollar-denominated assets. That means, among other things, that a 5% move in the dollar one way or another can have a big impact on reported dollar value of China’s euros, yen, pound and other currencies. China’s headline reserves fell in January. But the euro also fell in January. After adjusting for changes in the dollar value of China’s non-dollar portfolio, I find that China’s reserve actually increased a bit in January. Indeed, after adjusting for changes in the valuation of China’s existing euros, pounds and yen, I estimate that China’s reserves increased by $40-45b in the first quarter.

That though hinges on an assumption that China’s various hidden reserves — the PBoC’s other foreign assets, the CIC’s foreign portfolio, the state banks’ foreign portfolio – didn’t move around too much.*


The foreign assets that are not counted as part of China’s reserves are also quite large by now; they too would, if aggregated, rank among the world’s largest sovereign portfolios. They are roughly equal in size to the funds managed by the world’s largest existing sovereign funds. That is another indication of the enormous size of China’s foreign portfolio.

Clearly, the pace of growth in China’s reserves clearly has slowed. Quite dramatically. Reserve growth — counting all of China’s hidden reserves — has gone from nearly $200 billion a quarter (if not a bit more) to less than $50 billion a quarter. Indeed, reserve growth over the last several months, after adjusting for valuation changes, has been smaller than China’s trade surplus.


As Michael Pettis notes, that implies ongoing speculative — or “hot” — outflows.


But there is some evidence that the pace of the “hot” outflows has started to slow. Indeed, the evidence showing a turn here — assuming the data on the state banks’ doesn’t have any surprises — is better than the evidence showing a turnaround in trade flows.*** The non-deliverable forward market is no longer pricing in a depreciation of China’s currency, and in the past, changes in the NDF market have corresponded reasonable well with hot money flows.

I consequently wouldn’t be totally surprised if the pace of China’s reserve growth started to pick up again over the next couple of quarters. The fall in reserve growth over the past two quarters has corresponded to rise in capital outflows — not with a sustained fall in China’s trade surplus.

One last point: As Keith Bradsher of the New York Times notes, China’s trade surplus can help to finance the US deficit even if it doesn’t flow directly into China’s central bank. The money leaving China has to go somewhere, and no doubt a large fraction currently flows into US dollar-denominated assets. A decent chunk is still showing up in Hong Kong’s reserves for example, and the HKMA likely holds a dollar-heavily portfolio. Sustained hot money outflows would pose more problems for China than for the US.

* The main issue here is what happened to the state banks’ dollar reserve requirement; those dollars seem to be held on deposit at the PBoC, where they are counted as part of the PBoC’s balance sheet as “other foreign assets.” ** I am also assuming that China doesn’t mark its bond or equity portfolio to market, and thus changes in the market value of China’s existing investments have no material impact on China’s reported reserves. *** A fall in the reserve requirement and the PBoC’s other foreign assets reduces reserve growth, and thus would increase estimated hot money outflows. Adding in FDI outflows (Chinese mining companies expanding abroad) and the Rosneft loan, if it wasn’t financed out of the state banks existing pool of foreign exchange, by contrast, would tend to reduce estimated hot money outflows.

Originally published at the Council on Foreign Relations blog and reproduced here with the author’s permission.

2 Responses to "China’s reserves are still growing, but at a slower pace than before"

  1. bsetser   April 13, 2009 at 9:04 am

    Vitoria — i edited this a bit after posting it. if you could repost the edited version here, i would be grateful.bsetser

  2. Guest   May 11, 2009 at 8:43 pm

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